INTRODUCTION
The 2010 survey period was another active one for Indiana practitioners and 1 judges. As in previous years, this Survey presents both current and recent cases and relevant commentary about them in context by following the basic structure of the Indiana Product Liability Act (IPLA). This Survey does not attempt to 2 address in detail all of the cases decided during the survey period that involve product liability issues. Rather, it examines selected cases that discuss the more 3 important substantive concepts.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE IPLA
The IPLA, Indiana Code sections 34-20-1-1 to -9-1, governs and controls all actions that are brought by users or consumers against manufacturers or sellers for physical harm caused by a product, "regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought." When Indiana Code sections 34-The language the Indiana General Assembly employs in the IPLA is important for determining who qualifies as an IPLA claimant. Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1 provides that the IPLA governs claims asserted by "users" and "consumers." For purposes of the IPLA, "consumer" means:
11
(1) a purchaser; (2) any individual who uses or consumes the product; (3) any other person who, while acting for or on behalf of the injured party, was in possession and control of the product in question; or (4) any bystander injured by the product who would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use.
12
"User" has the same meaning as "consumer." Several published decisions in 13 5. Id. § 34-20-2-1(1). Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1 identifies a proper IPLA claimant as a "user" or "consumer. . Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1(1) requires that IPLA claimants be "in the class of persons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition." Id. § 34-20-2-1(1).
6. Id. § 34-20-1-1(2). Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1(2) identifies proper IPLA defendants as "manufacturers" or "sellers." Id. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1(2) provides the additional requirement that such a manufacturer or seller also be "engaged in the business of selling the product," effectively excluding corner lemonade stand operators and garage sale sponsors from IPLA liability. . 8. Id. § 34-20-2-1. 9. Id. § 34-20-2-1(3). 10. . A literal reading of the IPLA demonstrates that even if a claimant qualifies as a statutorily-defined "user" or "consumer," he or she also must satisfy another statutorily-defined threshold before proceeding with a claim under the IPLA. Id. § 34-20-2-1(1).
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14 Courts in Indiana have been relatively quiet since 2006 when it comes to interpreting the terms "user" or "consumer" for purposes of the IPLA, though 15 there was one federal trial court decision during last year's survey period. This 16 year's survey period did not produce any additional decisions on the topic.
B. "Manufacturer" or "Seller"
For purposes of the IPLA, "'[m]anufacturer' . . . means a person or an entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a product before the sale of the product to a user or consumer." "'Seller' . . . means a person engaged in the business of selling 17 or leasing a product for resale, use, or consumption." Indiana Code section 20-2-1(2) employs nearly identical language when addressing the threshold requirement that liability under the IPLA will not attach unless "the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product." 19 Courts hold sellers liable as manufacturers in two ways. First, a seller can be held liable as a manufacturer if the seller fits within the definition of "manufacturer" found in Indiana Code section 34-6-2-77(a). Second, a seller can be deemed a statutory "manufacturer" and can therefore be held liable to the same That additional threshold is found in Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1(1), which requires that the "user" or "consumer" also be "in the class of persons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition." Id. Thus, the plain language of the statute assumes that a person or entity must already qualify as a "user" or a "consumer" before a separate "reasonable foreseeability" analysis is undertaken. In that regard, the IPLA does not appear to provide a remedy to a claimant whom a seller might reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by a product's defective condition if that claimant falls outside of the IPLA's definition of "user" or "consumer." 14. See, e.g., Butler v. City of Peru, 733 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 2000) ; Estate of Shebel v. Yaskawa Elec. Am., Inc., 713 N.E.2d 275, 279 (Ind. 1999) . For a more detailed analysis of Butler, see Joseph R. Alberts & David M. Henn, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law, 34 IND. L. REV. 857, 870-72 (2001) . For a more detailed analysis of Estate of Shebel, see Joseph R. Alberts, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law, 33 IND. L. REV. 1331 REV. , 1333 REV. -36 (2000 .
15. During the 2006 survey period, the Indiana Supreme Court decided Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (W. Va.) , 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind. 2006 . That case helped to further define who qualifies as a "user" or "consumer" for purposes of bringing an action under the IPLA.
16. Pawlik v. Indus. Eng'g & Equip. Co., No. 2:07-CV-220, 2009 WL 857476 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2009 Practitioners also must be aware that when the theory of liability is based upon "strict liability in tort," Indiana Code section 34-20-2-3 provides that an 22 entity that is merely a "seller" and cannot otherwise be deemed a "manufacturer" is not liable and is not a proper IPLA defendant.
23
This has been a relatively active area of product liability law in recent years, and a number of recent Indiana decisions, particularly from Indiana federal courts, have addressed the statutory definitions of "seller" and "manufacturer." Id. Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. 2004) , is the most recent case interpreting Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4 and specifically addressed the circumstances under which entities may be considered "manufacturers" or "sellers" under the IPLA. See also Goines v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 99-CV-4307-JPG, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070, at *14-15 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2002 .
22. The phrase "strict liability in tort," to the extent that it is intended to mean "liability without regard to reasonable care," appears to encompass only claims that attempt to prove that a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous by utilizing a manufacturing defect theory. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-2 provides that a negligence standard governs cases utilizing a design defect or a failure to warn theory, not a "strict liability" standard. IND. CODE § 34-20-2-2.
23. Id. § 34-20-2-3. The IPLA makes it clear that liability without regard to the exercise of reasonable care (strict liability) applies only to product liability claims alleging a manufacturing defect theory, and a negligence standard controls claims alleging design or warning defect theories. See, e.g., Burt v. Makita USA, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2002) 
D. Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous
Only products that are in a "defective condition" are subject to IPLA liability. For purposes of the IPLA, a product is in a "defective condition" 46 if, at the time it is conveyed by the seller to another party, it is in a condition:
(1) not contemplated by reasonable persons among those considered expected users or consumers of the product; and (2) that will be unreasonably dangerous to the expected user or consumer when used in reasonably expectable ways of handling or consumption.
47
Recent cases confirm that establishing one of the foregoing threshold requirements without the other will not result in liability under the IPLA. Id. § 34-6-2-105(b); see, e.g., Miceli v. Ansell, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 492, 493 (Ind. 2001 ] nder the IPLA, the plaintiff must prove that the product was in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous." (citing Cole v. Lantis Corp., 714 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)) ).
Claimants in Indiana may prove that a product is in a "defective condition" by asserting one or a combination of three theories: (1) the product has a defect in its design (a "design defect"); (2) the product lacks adequate or appropriate warnings (a "warning defect"); or (3) the product has a defect that is the result of a problem in the manufacturing process (a "manufacturing defect").
49
Indiana law also defines when a product may be considered "unreasonably dangerous" for purposes of the IPLA. A product is "unreasonably dangerous" only if its use "exposes the user or consumer to a risk of physical harm . . . beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases . . . [it] with the ordinary knowledge about the product's characteristics common to the community of consumers."
A product is not unreasonably dangerous as a 50 matter of law if it injures in a fashion that, by objective measure, is known to the community of persons consuming the product.
51
In cases alleging improper design or inadequate warnings as the theory for proving that a product is in a "defective condition," recent decisions have recognized that the substantive defect analysis (i.e., whether a design was inappropriate or whether a warning was inadequate) should follow a threshold analysis that first examines whether, in fact, the product at issue is "unreasonably dangerous." The IPLA imposes a negligence standard in all product liability claims relying upon a design or warning theory to prove defectiveness, while retaining strict liability (liability despite the "exercise of all reasonable care") only for those claims relying upon a manufacturing defect theory. Despite the IPLA's 53 unambiguous language and several years' worth of authority recognizing that "strict liability" applies only in cases involving alleged manufacturing defects, some courts unfortunately continue to employ the term "strict liability" when referring to IPLA claims. Courts have discussed strict liability even when those claims allege warning and design defects and clearly accrued after the 1995 IPLA amendments took effect.
The IPLA makes clear that, just as in any other 54 negligence case, a claimant advancing design or warning defect theories must satisfy the traditional negligence requirements: duty, breach, injury, and causation.
55
The 2010 survey period produced yet another decision dealing directly with whether a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. In 57. Id. at *9. Before granting Yamaha's summary judgment motion, the court issued two earlier opinions. The first, issued on October 16, 2009 , 2009 WL 3401978 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 16, 2009 , granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a response to Yamaha's motion to dismiss. Id. at *3. In the second, the court denied Yamaha's motion to dismiss as a sanction against plaintiff for his failure to preserve the motorcycle at issue. 2009 WL 5200537, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 23, 2009 presence of a defect in the intake valves, which were the subject of the previous recall.
65
Judge Springmann reasoned that regardless of the substantive IPLA theory on which the plaintiff proceeded, he was required to prove that the motorcycle was in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous. The 66 dispositive issue was whether the loss of power which the plaintiff claimed to have experienced was the result of a defect in the motorcycle, particularly in its intake valves. The plaintiff relied on testimony from a motorcycle mechanic 67 and Yamaha's recall notice. The court found the mechanic's testimony 68 unconvincing because it assumed that the incident was caused by the recall.
69
Similarly, the plaintiff could not rely on the recall notice issued by Yamaha because it was a subsequent remedial measure. Because there was no 70 admissible evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the plaintiff's motorcycle was manufactured and designed with a specific defect, his product liability claims failed as a matter of law.
71
We now addresses in detail a few cases in which plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate that products were defective and unreasonably dangerous utilizing warning, design, and manufacturing defect theories. In failure to warn cases, the "unreasonably dangerous" inquiry is essentially the same as the requirement that the defect be latent or hidden. 
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The 2010 survey period added five more cases to that list, all of which merit further discussion here. The first one, Gardner v. Tristar Sporting Arms, Ltd., 84 involved a plaintiff who was injured when a shotgun he was holding in his lap discharged. The plaintiff testified that he placed the shotgun across his lap with 85 the safety turned to the "on" position as he drove his ATV home from a hunting trip. He alleged that the shotgun spontaneously fired, even with the safety on.
86 87
Investigators at the scene confirmed that the safety was on and that the shotgun could be fired despite the safety. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer 88 negligently failed to warn of this danger. The manufacturer moved for summary 89 judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the failure to warn claim 90 because it was undisputed that the plaintiff failed to read the gun's instruction manual, noting that
[e]vidence that the plaintiff, injured party, or other party instrumental in the use of the product leading to an injury failed to read instructions or warnings which were provided with the product may be sufficient to entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of law, at least where the failure to read the instructions or warnings is not disputed.
91
Because the plaintiff admitted he did not read the instruction manual, the plaintiff could not show that the alleged inadequate warnings caused the plaintiff's injury.
92
The second warnings defect case we address, Colter v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., was one in which the plaintiff was injured by a device used to make 93 automotive parts called a "shooter press." The machine requires both hands to 94 be placed on proximity switches to operate.
The plaintiff argued that "the 95 shooter press spontaneously cycled onto his hand" when he reached out to take a finished part off the press. The plaintiff claimed that improper and negligent 96 wiring of the proximity switches allowed the shooter press to cycle REV. 1247 REV. , 1262 REV. -64 (2004 ; see also In cases such as this one that involve an off-label use of a prescription drug that is not endorsed or promoted by the manufacturer, the requisite knowledge of the risk is two-fold: the manufacturer must know (or be charged with knowledge of) both that the off-label use is occurring and that the off-label use carries with it risk of harm at issue-in this case, damaged cartilage.
109
The plaintiff offered evidence of several articles suggesting that repeated injections can cause harm to cartilage. However, the court found that as a The fifth warnings defect case was styled Hatter v. Pierce Manufacturing, Inc. It was a case in which the plaintiff was a firefighter who was injured when 124 a cap on a fire truck's intake pipe was propelled off the pipe by pressurized air.
125
The plaintiff brought a failure to warn claim, and the manufacturer argued that the sophisticated intermediary doctrine was a defense.
The App. 2009 ), vacated, 936 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 2010 . We predicted then that the guidance provided by the Moore opinion might prove to be short-lived because the Indiana Supreme Court had granted transfer when the article was published. See Alberts et al., supra note 25, at 899. That turned out to be prophetic because the Moore decision was supplanted by the Indiana Supreme Court's decision only a few months later. Although the Indiana Supreme Court's decision has now been issued, the court of appeals decision nevertheless remains noteworthy for its comprehensive, scholarly collection and analysis of Indiana's substantive product liability law.
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160
The court agreed with the defense claims that Moore's estate bore the burden of proving that Ford breached a duty of care.
Claims of insufficient evidence 161 to support a verdict are reviewed under a deferential standard. Examining the 162 evidence through this lens, the court was persuaded that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the jury's verdict against Ford for negligent design.
The plaintiff presented expert testimony from a published mechanical 163 engineer who had studied rollovers. This expert testified that the vehicle's 164 seatbelt system was defective because it allowed "the belt to become unlocked during the rollover portion of a rollover." Moreover, the expert opined that had 165 Ford chosen a seatbelt system design with a pretensioner in the retractor, a system which Ford had used in other passenger vehicles, particularly in Europe, then the belt would not have been able to come unlocked in the collision. Ford disputed 166 this evidence and attacked the expert's credibility, countering that there was no proof that the alternative design was safer.
167
The court, however, was not persuaded. Ford's decision to equip the vehicle at issue without using a retractor pretensioner that it used in other vehicles manufactured in Europe was probative evidence of whether Ford acted with reasonable care.
"For the purpose of appellate review for sufficiency, such 168 evidence may support a reasonable inference of seatbelt system design negligence."
169 Similarly, the court was convinced that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support the claim that Ford was negligent when it designed the vehicle's sunroof. Ford argued that the record lacked evidence to support the conclusion 170 that the sunroof became dislodged during the rollover by occupant forces instead of as a result of the violence of the collision.
And, Ford argued, even if there 171 was such evidence, there was no evidence the sunroof became dislodged due to a structural failure.
172
The court concluded that whether the roof opening occurred because the glass sunroof became detached due to occupant forces or the severe nature of the collision was not determinative.
It in the record that Moore was ejected through the sunroof opening when the glass became dislodged because its mounting brackets failed. The estate had also 175 presented evidence that: had Moore remained inside the vehicle, "he should have survived the accident"; the rollover tendency of sport utility vehicles was widely known before the vehicle at issue was built; and "the use of a stronger sunroof bracket design was technologically and economically feasible." The court did 176 not reweigh the evidence or assess witness credibility. As such, it could not 177 conclude that there was "a complete absence of evidence or reasonable inferences favoring the jury's verdict," and it concluded that "[it] must defer to the jury."
178
The court could not find that the jury decision to attribute partial fault to Ford was unreasonable when it examined the evidence offered and the inferences to be drawn from this evidence.
179
Finally, even though some argument and evidence was offered during trial that the vehicle had design defects relating to its handling and stability, this issue was not submitted to the jury because it was omitted from the trial court's final jury instructions. In addition, the plaintiff did not make reference to a design defect claim in counsel's final argument. Because the issue was neither presented to the jury nor a basis for the verdict, the court declined to address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the claim.
180
Second, TRW, Ford's supplier of the seatbelt assembly, claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict against it for negligence.
181
TRW argued that the evidence at trial proved that "the seatbelt assembly was manufactured according to, and fully complied with, Ford's detailed specifications." In addition, "the seatbelt assembly design was used in the vast 182 majority of cars produced at the time," and Moore's accident was reasonably unforeseeable when the seatbelt assembly was made.
Again, the court relied 183 upon the plain language of the IPLA and wrote that because the estate's claims against TRW alleged defective design, strict liability did not apply. related to nonparty fault allocation would often be beyond the purview of this Survey, but because the nonparty claims against Goodyear (as the designer, supplier, and/or manufacturer of the tire that failed in the accident) were governed by the IPLA, it is worthy of brief comment. Id. (quoting IND. CODE § 34-20-2-2 (2011) Id. 190. Id. 191. Id. 192. Id. at 215-16. 193. Id. at 216. 194. Id. 195. Id. at 224. 196. See id. (citing IND. CODE § § 34-51-2-15 and 34-20-8-1(b) (2011) One of the tires on the vehicle involved in the rollover was a Goodyear tire.
185.

198
The vehicle was traveling approximately sixty to seventy miles per hour when the "'tire event started to unfold.'" Although some testimony related to the tire's 199 role was elicited, detailed examination or evidence concerning the cause of the tire failure and its specific role in the collision event was never elicited beyond the facts that the tire failed and that this failure precipitated the rollover. The 200 court concluded that because there was no evidence establishing whether the tire failure resulted from a tire defect, normal wear and tear, underinflation, a slow leak, road hazard, puncture, or some other cause, there was insufficient evidence to support a product liability verdict against Goodyear if it were a party. Thus, 201 insufficient evidence existed to support fault allocation against Goodyear as a nonparty.
202
The Moore decision could prove to be significant for many reasons. It adds to the ever-growing body of Indiana case law applying negligence principles to product liability cases involving claims of defective design(s) and discussing the importance of establishing the existence of feasible alternative design(s). This, however, should not be surprising because it is the application of the plain language in the IPLA. The decision is also instructive in situations where product liability theories are applicable to a nonparty to be included on the verdict form for fault allocation. In these situations, one needs to remain mindful of the burden the party pleading the nonparty defense must meet. Indeed, the jury in the Moore case attributed as much fault to Goodyear as it did to Ford. Thus, one 203 could infer that the jury may have concluded that the tire's failure played as much of a role in causing the collision and Moore's death as it was persuaded the design decisions Moore asserted were made by Ford. Perhaps most importantly is the holding that a manufacturer who supplies a product that is to be incorporated into a larger or completed product may have available a viable defense to a design defect claim when this manufacturer supplies the component in compliance with the provided specifications. Moore seems to suggest that this would be particularly true when the supplier makes the manufacturer aware of (and/or perhaps suggests) other alternatives, but does not have the ability to provide alternatives. Logic seems to dictate that in these situations it would be more difficult for the component manufacturer not to have exercised reasonable care.
In the second of the three cases in this area, The third decision in this area is the Gardner case, which we addressed above in connection with the warning defect theory. There, the plaintiff was injured when a shotgun he was holding in his lap discharged.
The create a question of fact as to whether the shotgun was, in fact, manufactured in a condition that was unexpected and unintended by the manufacturer in that it allegedly fired while the safety was still engaged.
224
E. Regardless of the Substantive Legal Theory
Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1 provides that the IPLA "governs all actions that are: (1) brought by a user or consumer; (2) against a manufacturer or seller; and (3) for physical harm caused by a product; regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought."
At the same time, 225 however, Indiana Code section 34-20-1-2 provides that the IPLA "shall not be construed to limit any other action from being brought against a seller of a product."
226
The IPLA is quite clear that for its purposes, "physical harm" means "bodily injury, death, loss of services, and rights arising from any such injuries, as well as sudden, major damage to property." It "does not include gradually evolving 227 damage to property or economic losses from such damage."
Thus, reading the 228 statutory language along with the relevant definitions, the Indiana General Assembly appears to have intended that the IPLA provide the exclusive remedy against an entity that the IPLA defines to be a product's "manufacturer" or a "seller" by a person the IPLA defines to be a "user" or "consumer" of a product when that product has caused sudden and major damage to property, personal injury, or death. The Indiana General Assembly seemingly has carved out an exception to the IPLA's exclusive remedy only when the defendant otherwise fits the definition of a "seller" under the IPLA and when the type of harm suffered by the Such theories of recovery appear to be the "other" actions the Indiana Code section 34-20-1-2 intended not to limit in the previous section (34-20-1-1). So what theories of recovery against "sellers" are intended by section 34-20-1-2 to escape the IPLA's exclusive remedy requirement? The vast majority (if not all) 231 of those claims would appear to consist of gradually-developing property damage and the type of economic losses typically authorized by the common law of contracts, warranty, or the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). That would seem the logical interpretation of section 34-20-1-2 because this section seeks not to limit all "other" claims, which, by necessary implication, must mean all claims "other" than the ones identified in the previous section (claims for personal injury, death, and sudden, major property damage).
232
Thus, when it comes to claims by users or consumers against manufacturers and sellers for physical harm caused by a product, the remedies provided by common law or the UCC should be "merged" into the IPLA-based cause of action.
Claims for economic losses or gradually developing property damage
There also have been, however, at least two peculiar decisions in recent years holding that claimants who have suffered sudden and major damage to property and/or personal injury may nevertheless maintain actions against product manufacturers and sellers based upon legal theories derived from authority outside the IPLA. Those May 14, 2009 ). In Gastite, the court refused to merge separate breach of express and implied warranty claims with IPLA-based claims against a manufacturer even though the harm suffered was property damage caused by a house fire. Id. at *9-11.
246. In a footnote, the Gastite court wrote that " [a] lthough the IPLA provides a single cause of action for a user seeking to recover in tort from a manufacturer for harm caused by a defective product, a plaintiff may maintain a separate cause of action under a breach of warranty theory." Id. at *7 n.1 (internal citation omitted). The authority cited for that statement is Hitachi Construction Machine Co. v. AMAX Coal Co., 737 N.E.2d 460, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) . Reliance on Hitachi to support that point is tenuous at best, though, because the authority cited in Hitachi on that point is from 1991, four years before the Indiana General Assembly changed the law when it enacted the 1995 amendments to the IPLA to add the "regardless of the substantive legal theory" language. The case upon which the Hitachi panel relied is B&B Paint Corp. v. Shrock Manufacturing, Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1017 , 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991 
